Monographs

[M2] Knowledge Ascriptions: Insensitive Accounts, Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, forthcoming.
[M1] Epistemic Invariantism and Contextualist Intuitions, Berlin: Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (PhD thesis), 2015.

Journal articles

[J11] "Relativism and conservatism," Erkenntnis, forthcoming.
[J10] "Knowledge and availability," Philosophical Psychology, 31/4, 2018, 554-573.
[J9] "Anti-intellectualism, egocentrism and bank case intuitions," Philosophical Studies, 175/11, 2018, 2841–2857.
[J8] "Knowledge, intuition and implicature," Synthese, 195/6, 2018, 2821–2843.
[J7] "Relativism, disagreement and testimony," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98/S1, 2017, 497-519.
[J6] "Relativism and assertion," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95/4, 2017, 730-740.
[J5] "Skeptical pragmatic invariantism: good, but not good enough," Synthese, 193/8, 2016, 2577-2593.
[J4] "Epistemic invariantism and contextualist intuitions," Episteme, 13/2, 2016, 219-232.
[J3] "Innocent implicatures," Journal of Pragmatics, 87, 2015, 54-63.
[J2] "The many-relations problem for adverbialism," Analysis, 75/2, 2015, 231-237.
[J1] "Epistemic contextualism can be stated properly," Synthese, 191/15, 2014, 3541-3556.

See philpapers.org for penultimate versions.

Work in progress

A direction effect on taste predicates (with Julia Zakkou)
A paper on the acquaintance inference for predicates of personal taste (with Julia Zakkou)
A paper defending a psychological account of practical factor effects on knowledge ascriptions
An experimental philosophy paper on stakes effects on knowledge ascriptions (with Julia Zakkou)